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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-HABEAS CORPUS-STATE PRISONERS-WAIVER
OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS-GRAND JURY COMPOSITION-The United
States Supreme Court has held that absent both a showing of cause
for failure to make a timely objection and a showing of actual preju-
dice, a state prisoner's failure to comply with a state statute provid-
ing that defects in indictment must be raised prior to trial or be
deemed waived precludes federal habeas corpus relief on a subse-
quent claim that blacks had been excluded from the grand jury.
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
Abraham Francis, a seventeen-year-old black youth, was indicted
for felony murder by a Louisiana grand jury. The charges arose from
a robbery of a white couple in which Francis and three other blacks
allegedly participated, and in which the victim of the killing was one
of the alleged robbers.' Blacks served on the indicting grand jury but
the method of selection-eliminating daily wage earners-had the
effect of excluding blacks disproportionately.2 Represented by state-
appointed, uncompensated counsel, who was unfamiliar with crimi-
nal procedure and who took practically no action in his client's
behalf, Francis was found guilty and sentenced to life imprison-
ment.3 Neither Francis nor his counsel had objected to the composi-
tion of the grand jury prior to or during his one-day trial.
Francis did not appeal from his conviction. Over five years later,
however, he sought habeas corpus relief in the Louisiana courts on
the ground there had been racial discrimination in the selection of
the grand jury which had indicted him.' The Louisiana court denied
the writ: under Louisiana law5 failure to make timely objection,
prior to trial, to defects in the indictment was a waiver of the right
1. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 554 (1976).
2. Id. at 538 n.2.
3. Id. at 554.
4. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has long been held to guaran-
tee a grand jury free from discriminatory selection processes. In Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880), a case decided not long after the ratification of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state statute excluding Negroes from grand
jury duty. More recently, the Court has recognized that discrimination may exist in practice
although not intended by statute. In Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), a defendant
established unconstitutional discrimination in the grand jury selection by showing the sta-
tistical improbability, on the basis of race, of the composition of the grand jury which in-
dicted him, and the existence of procedures which provided ready opportunities for discrimi-
nation despite the fact blacks were not completely excluded.
5. See LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 535(B)(3) (West 1967).
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to assert the claim in collateral proceedings. Francis then sought
relief in federal district court.' The District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana granted the writ, holding that the prisoner had
made out a prima facie case of discrimination in the grand jury
selection which the state had neither factually rebutted nor vitiated
by proving a deliberate waiver by Francis.7 Furthermore, the district
court determined that Francis' failure to timely object to the grand
jury procedure was justified; cause was satisfied by proof that his
court-appointed lawyer was inexperienced in criminal practice
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
the district court. Unlike the district court, the circuit court ac-
cepted the waiver argument asserted by the state. Additionally, the
Fifth Circuit added the requirement that for a state prisoner to be.
entitled to federal habeas corpus relief, he must demonstrate that
actual prejudice resulted from the unconstitutional'procedure.9 The
court of appeals remanded the case to allow Francis an opportunity
to prove that actual prejudice had resulted from the state's method
of selecting grand jurors. On certiorari,' 0 the Supreme Court af-
firmed."
In the majority opinion, the Court first observed that federal dis-
trict judges had discretionary power to grant a writ of habeas corpus
in a case such as Francis, but framed the issue in terms of the
appropriate exercise of that power." Six members of the Court,
through Justice Stewart, reaffirmed their decision in Davis v.
6. Francis sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970), which provides in relevant part:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
Federal courts are to entertain the application for habeas corpus where the applicant can
establish or the state admits "that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate
hearing in the State court proceeding; or . . . that the applicant was otherwise denied due
process of law in the State court proceeding." Id.
7. See Newman v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 896, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1974). Newman was a
Louisiana prisoner whose case was consolidated with Francis'.
8. Id. at 897-98.
9. Id. at 898-99.
10. Francis v. Henderson, 421 U.S. 946 (1975).
11. 425 U.S. at 542.
12. Id. at 538-39.
13. The majority included Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehn-
quist, Stewart, and White. Neither Justice Marshall nor Justice Stevens participated in the
decision; Justice Brennan alone dissented.
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United States"s which had denied a federal prisoner habeas relief
when he had failed to timely object to the grand jury composition.
Davis, premised on notions of orderly criminal procedure and final-
ity of convictions, permitted a denial of habeas relief to federal
prisoners asserting constitutional claims where rights had been
waived by procedural default and no cause for waiver was shown.,'
In the Court's view, the reasons underlying that decision called for
a similar result where a state prisoner presented a similar constitu-
tional claim.'" Without attempting to distinguish the cases fac-
tually, 7 Justice Stewart justified extending the Davis rule to state
prisoners by comparing the Louisiana statute to Federal Rule
12(b)(2)"5 under which Davis had been decided. The Court reasoned
that state waiver provisions served the same purposes as the parallel
federal procedural rules: 9 they were legitimate methods for effec-
tuating orderly administration of criminal justice and deterring pos-
sible abuses of process. Speaking in broad terms of comity and
federalism,'" the Court refused to intervene in the state criminal
proceeding as the federal district court had done. It held that the
court of appeals had correctly applied Davis in denying relief to a
state prisoner who raised a constitutional challenge to a grand jury's
composition after having failed to timely object.' Future prisoners
would have to show cause for the failure to object and actual preju-
dice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation in order to
obtain habeas relief.22
Justice Brennan, the sole dissenter, relied on Fay v. Noia,23 the
landmark habeas corpus decision of the Warren Court. Fay opened
14. 411 U.S. 233 (1973). See text accompanying notes 33 & 34 infra.
15. 411 U.S. at 243-45.
16. 425 U.S. at 541-42.
17. See text accompanying notes 35 & 36 infra.
18. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2) directs that defects in an indictment not raised prior to trial
are deemed to be waived unless cause for not timely challenging the indictment is shown.
19. The important state interests recognized by the Court included the discouragement
of tactical abuses by criminal defendants, the orderly administration of justice free from
federal interference, and the finality of convictions. 425 U.S. at 540-42. If the requested relief
were granted in this type of case, the state would be faced with the reopening of all convictions
resulting from indictments issued by this particular grand jury. Conceivably, all indictments
ordered while the unconstitutional method of selection was used would be open to attack, or
at least all indictments against blacks for whom the presumption of prejudice would arise.
20. Id. at 541-42.
21. Id. at 542.
22. Id. at 542. See note 41 infra regarding the actual prejudice requirement.
23. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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habeas relief to state prisoners presenting constitutional claims even
though procedural defaults would have barred direct review of their
cases, so long as those defaults had not been conscious and deliber-
ate bypasses of other avenues of review.24 Justice Brennan, who had
authored the majority opinion in Fay, reaffirmed the Court's defini-
tion of waiver in that case as being a purposeful and intelligent act
on the part of the defendant." Finding no such waiver in Francis,
he reminded the majority that federal courts were meant to be the
ultimate arbiters of constitutional claims, and that historically the
states have not always been solicitous of constitutional rights." He
objected to the majority's imposition of the obstacle of demonstrat-
ing actual prejudice, and suggested that such a showing might be
impossible. Since the majority opinion was in conflict with Fay,
which had approved habeas relief where a confession had been
coerced in violation of the fourteenth amendment, Justice Brennan
read Francis as either impliedly overruling Fay or creating a distinc-
tion between the two substantive constitutional claims which deni-
grated the importance of a constitutionally composed grand jury.27
24. Id. at 434-35, 438. Fay brought to the area of habeas corpus the classic definition of
waiver enunciated by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938): an
"intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." See also note 30
infra.
25. 425 U.S. at 543-45 (dissenting opinion). Fay restricted the waiver of a constitutional
right to circumstances where a habeas applicant had "deliberately sought to subvert or evade
the orderly adjudication of his federal defenses in the state courts." 372 U.S. at 433. The
waiver had to be a knowing and intelligent one. See note 24 supra.
26. It might be argued that the federal forum is a more appropriate one for considering
procedural claims due to the court's remoteness from the crime. Local courts, more concerned
with substantive as opposed to procedural matters and also subject to regional sentiment,
might arguably have difficulty in isolating issues of constitutional-procedural guarantees.
The Supreme Court has recently reiterated that the habeas writ is "the fundamental instru-
ment for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action." Harris
v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969) (district court must grant evidentiary hearing to habeas
applicant upon appropriate showing of unconstitutional procedure). See also Amsterdam,
Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793 (1965);
Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L.
REV. 423 (1961). For the view that increased federal judicial intervention in state affairs is
neither necessary nor wise see Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal
Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity, and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & Soc. 0.
557. Judge Aldisert characterized the expanded role of the federal courts as a movement
toward a de facto national court system, and argued for a reinvestment of trust in the state
courts.
27. 425 U.S. at 546 (dissenting opinion).
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To understand the import of Francis, the case must be read in
context with the Supreme Court's earlier habeas corpus decisions,
particularly Fay and Davis. Historically, the expansion of federal
habeas corpus relief to state prisoners was checked by the doctrine
of exhaustion of state remedies.2" However, as the substantive
grounds upon which habeas relief could be granted have increased
commensurately with the protections afforded by the fourteenth
amendment, the Court has restricted the exhaustion requirement to
remedies still available to the prisoner or remedies purposefully
bypassed.29 The Supreme Court's decision in Fay v. Noia marked a
peak in extending the writ to safeguard a criminal defendant's con-
stitutional rights despite his failure to comply with state procedural
requirements. Fay granted habeas relief to a defendant who had
decided, in consultation with his counsel, not to pursue a state
appeal for fear of a retrial resulting in a possible death penalty3 but
later, sought collateral relief in federal court on the ground that his
confession had been coerced. The Fay majority enunciated a waiver
standard which gave the prisoner the benefit of every doubt. Only
if the habeas applicant "understandingly and knowingly forewent
the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state
courts"'" would it be open for the district court to deny him relief,
28. Although the power of the federal courts to issue the writ to state prisoners is statu-
tory, see note 6 supra, the scope of that power has been expanded and contracted by a series
of judicial decisions often responsive to political trends. See Bator, Finality in Criminal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441, 463-99 (1963); Reitz,
Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1315
(1961). In Fay, both the majority and dissenting opinions review and analyze the history of
habeas corpus and arrive at different conclusions. 372 U.S. at 399-415; id. at 449-63 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 53 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited
as WRIGHT].
Three cases are particularly notable in the development of the doctrine of exhaustion of
state remedies. In Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), the Supreme Court denied a prisoner
habeas relief where he applied for the writ prior to his trial in state court. In Ex parte Fonda,
117 U.S. 516 (1886), decided the same year, the Court directed a prisoner who had sought
the writ following trial and conviction to return to the state forum to exhaust state appellate
review. The doctrine was further refined by the requirement that a prisoner apply for a state
writ of habeas corpus before his federal application would be entertained. Mooney v. Holo-
han, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
29. See the discussion in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426-34 (1963), reviewing the rationale
of the exhaustion of state remedies doctrine.
30. The Court characterized the petitioner's choice whether to accept life imprisonment
or to appeal and risk retrial with a possible death penalty as a "grisly" one, which under the
circumstances could not be considered a tactical or strategic decision or "in any way a
deliberate circumvention of state procedures." Id. at 440.
31. Id. at 439.
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and then only after the federal court had satisfied itself as to the
reasons for the applicant's default by conducting a hearing or by
other appropriate means.2 The prisoner's decision not to appeal,
based on fear of a death penalty following retrial, did not constitute
an intelligent and voluntary bypass of state procedures; therefore,
his claim that his confession' was coerced was not foreclosed from
federal review.
Davis clearly broke from the Fay precedent by allowing an extin-
guishment of constitutional rights through an inadvertent omission
of proper procedures. In Davis, a federal prisoner sought habeas
relief several years after his conviction, contending for the first time
that the jury which had indicted him was unconstitutionally com-
posed. The Supreme Court affirmed the federal district court's de-
nial of habeas relief under Federal Rule 12(b)(2), which requires
that allegations of defects in an indictment be raised prior to trial
or be considered waived absent a showing of cause.33 There was no
determination by the Court that Davis' failure to assert his claim
at the proper time was a deliberate bypass, as required by Fay. In
Davis, the unconstitutionality of the grand jury selection had not
been demonstrated, no cause had been advanced to excuse the fail-
ure to timely object, and no actual prejudice had been proven as an
alternate method of providing relief from the waiver rule. 34
Although the Court applied Davis to Francis by comparing the
procedural rules for federal and state courts, the cases differed in
several important respects that neither the majority nor dissenting
opinion in Francis. fully acknowledged. First, Davis had not demon-
strated the inadequacy of his representation as Francis had done in
order to establish cause for waiver. 35 Second, in Francis, the uncon-
stitutionality of the grand jury selection process was proven in the
district court; in Davis, two white accomplices were indicted with
the defendant, a black, thus rebutting any presumption of preju-
dice .3 Finally, the Court in Davis offered the prisoner the opportun-
32. Id.
33. 411 U.S. at 245.
34. Id. at 243-45.
35. In contrast with Francis, Davis' court-appointed counsel received a commendation
from the court of appeals. Davis v. United States, 409 F.2d 1095, 1101 (5th Cir. 1969). For
further discussion on' the relationship between ineffective counsel and the waiver of the
defendant's constitutional rights see note 38 infra.
36. 411 U.S. at 235.
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ity to show that prejudice had resulted from the allegedly unconsti-
tutional procedure as an alternate means of obtaining relief rather
than as an additional requirement to showing.cause for waiver.
Francis, where a state prisoner had proven his constitutional claim
and demonstrated cause for waiver due to inadequate representa-
tion, was a much stronger case for federal relief than Davis where
there had been adequate counsel, an unsupported constitutional
claim, and original access to the federal forum.37
Francis involved more than simply extending the rationale in
Davis to state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief. Al-
though the majority's argument was that considerations of comity
required extension of the rule in Davis to the case of a state prisoner,
it is clear that the extension is more than jurisdictional. Francis has
substantially altered the concept of waiver, which now apparently
includes not only waivers by competent, counsel, s as in Davis, but
also waivers of which neither the defendant nor his counsel were
aware. Although it seems clear that Francis represents a retrench-
ment from the "knowing and intelligent" waiver standard of Fay,39
37. The habeas applications of Davis and Francis -were brought under separate federal
statutes. Davis filed his claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), a statutory substitute for habeas
corpus for prisoners who arealready within the federal system. There is an implicit presump-
tion that constitutional claims brought by a federal prisoner in a federal court will be fully
and fairly vindicated; the federal court "shall not be required to entertain a second or succes-
sive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner." Id. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970),
under which Francis brought his claim, is the codification, with subsequent revisions, of a
Reconstruction measure intended to protect the federal constitutional rights of citizens tried
in state courts. See WRIGHT, supra note 28, at 237.
38. In Fay, the majority had noted that "[a] choice made by counsel not participated in
by the petitioner does not automatically bar relief." 372 U.S. at 439. In Henry v. Mississippi,
379 U.S. 443, 451 (1965), the Supreme Court held that a waiver by an attorney without the
participation of his client would, except in unusual circumstances, be effective if the waiver
was a tactical move. Courts have since split over what degree of participation by the defen-
dant in his counsel's decisions would constitute a waiver. See generally White, Federal Ha-
beas Corpus: The Impact of the Failure to Assert a Constitutional Claim at Trial, 58 VA. L.
REv. 67, 69-78 (1972). The majority in Francis did not consider the problem of the inadequacy
of counsel; only the dissent addressed the issue. The Supreme Court long ago recognized that
the right to counsel encompasses the right to adequate representation. See Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45, 58-59 (1932) (assigned counsel must be given proper preparation time to
be effective). Although the Powell opinion noted that "[elven the intelligent and educated
layman ...requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him," id. at 69, very little has been done by courts or legislatures to reinforce this right.
Neither assigned counsel nor public defenders have won the confidence of clients-or com-
mentators. See, e.g., S. NAGEL, THE RIGHTS OF THE AccUSED 151 (1975); Casper, Did you Have
a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had a Public Defender, 1 ,YALE L. REV. OF L. &
Soc. AcT., 4 (Spring 1971).
39. See notes 24 & 25 supra.
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the Court's failure to articulate guidelines as to the parameters of
its new standard leaves the current definition of waiver unclear.
Lower courts which have been following the deliberate bypass test
of Fay4" and its knowing and intelligent waiver standard will have
to determine for themselves to what extent, if at all, Fay still con-
trols.
A second extension of Davis, which also has the potential to re-
duce the number of habeas writs granted by federal judges, is the
Francis Court's requirement that a petitioner show "actual preju-
dice" 4' resulting from the unconstitutional procedure in addition to
showing cause for not challenging that procedure. In Davis, the
opportunity to demonstrate prejudice had been proposed as an al-
ternative to showing cause for a waiver: although Davis had not
justified the waiver of his constitutional right by failing to timely
object, he could have been granted relief upon a showing that the
grand jury composition had led to prejudice in his case.42 It may be
that the Court in Davis intended this alternative as a safety valve
for cases where a waiver had occurred but where the resulting preju-
40. See, eg., Paine v. McCarthy, 527 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 957
(1976) (knowing waiver not present where attorney frustrated client's desire to have claim
raised on appeal); Hopkins v. Anderson, 507 F.2d 530 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
920 (1975) (waiver not sufficient unless made with awareness of relevant circumstances and
likely results); Montgomery v. Hopper, 488 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1973) (failure to file state appeal
held not to constitute a deliberate bypass absent clear proof that waiver was made knowingly
in an effort to secure some benefit to defendant).
41. The requirement of a showing of "actual prejudice" was imposed by the Davis Court
without explanation. The Court did determine, however, that a requirement of actual preju-
dice was not inconsistent with the presumption of prejudice giving rise to the very existence
of the substantive right. 411 U.S. at 244-45. The Francis majority similarly refused to explain
how a defendant might prove actual prejudice; it imposed the requirement and simply cited
to Davis. 425 U.S. at 542 & n.6. A presumption of prejudice would normally arise from
showing a fact situation which would indicate or imply a likelihood of prejudice. See Peters
v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (prejudice presumed on showing of racial discrimination in grand
jury selection, regardless of defendant's race). Actual prejudice may require proof of prejudice
in fact resulting to the defendant. The term appeared but was not defined in United States
v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), a case involving an alleged violation of the sixth amendment
right to a speedy trial caused by pre-arrest delay. Although the Court found that no presump-
tion of prejudice arose from delay in making an arrest, it admitted that in some cases actual
prejudice could result to a defendant. Id. at 323-24. Since the case was remanded for a
showing of actual prejudice as a means of obtaining relief, the concept was a beneficial one
for the defendant, whom the Court had determined had no constitutional right to a speedy
arrest. Id. at 324. Marion, however, is distinguishable from Francis where there was a well-
settled constitutional right and an admitted violation of that right. See 425 U.S. at 555-56
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. 411 U.S. at 245.
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dice to the defendant was blatant. There is no explanation by the
Francis majority for the adoption of the prejudice requirement as an
additional barrier to obtaining habeas relief. The requirement of
"actual prejudice" is even more alarming in view of the Court's prior
acknowledgement in Peters v. Kiff43 that proof of actual harm from
an unconstitutionally composed jury is "virtually impossible to ad-
duce.""
Francis intimate4 a reconsideration by the Supreme Court of
many of the concerns underlying the writ of habeas corpus, concerns
which ultimately determine whether or not a federal court should
grant the writ. First, there is the tension between substantive con-
stitutional rights and the requirements for order and finality essen-
tial to the administration of criminal justice. A waiver of a constitu-
tional right may logically legitimize an otherwise defective proceed-
ing: for example, although an unconstitutional indictment would
normally invalidate the subsequent trial and conviction, the failure
to timely object serves to eliminate the defect.45 This result is paitic-
ularly harsh, however, where the failure was an involuntary, uncon-
scious act-as in Francis. The argument that a prisoner cannot
complain of his custody where he chose not to raise an objection that
would have resulted in release obviously fails here, where there was
no recognition of the possibility of release. The Supreme Court's
preference for finality over the substantive constitutional right lost
is troubling in view of the desirability of trying defendants only
when they are fully cognizant of their constitutional rights.
Second, the evolvement in Fay, Davis, and Francis shifts the
burden of accountability for safeguarding the individual's constitu-
tional rights. Fay placed responsibility on the federal courts to scru-
tinize the record to insure that a procedural default was adequate
to bar federal relief." In Davis, the Supreme Court inferred a waiver
from the circumstance that no timely objection had been made, and
required the prisoner to prove otherwise. 7 The Francis Court im-
43. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
44. Id. at 504.
45. One commentator has observed that "[tlo deprive a person of legal process because
of procedural default is always a grave matter; [one that is] doubly true where federal
processes are withdrawn because of default under a state procedural rule." Reitz, supra note
28, at 1317.
46. See 372 U.S. at 438-39; text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
47. 411 U.S. at 245.
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posed a waiver where none had been intended," and required not
only a showing of cause but also proof of prejudice. The effect, then,
has been to place heavier burdens on the applicant seeking entry to
the federal forum. This result is difficult to reconcile with the
Court's former stance that when an individual seeks federal review
of his constitutional claim through a writ of habeas corpus, federal
courts were to insure that these liberty rights were not denied
"without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial re-
view."4 At the very least, the Francis decision portends a greater
tolerance for defects in constitutional criminal procedure coexten-
sive with a greater deference towards state courts and their ability
and willingness to safeguard federal constitutional rights. As
Francis and other recent Supreme Court cases illustrate, procedural
flaws which at one time might have been considered fatal to an
otherwise valid conviction are now thought to be not so fundamen-
tally defective as to render the resulting custody constitutionally
intolerable.0
There is, in the language of the Francis decision, an attempted
accommodation between the competing interests of personal liber-
ties and the efficient administration of justice. Besides insuring
both the integrity of state court decisions and cooperation between
state and federal courts, Francis' stated purposes, the Supreme
Court may have also been responding to the increased workload of
the federal courts.5 Francis, and cases following it, may reduce the
number of applications for habeas corpus relief by closing off cate-
48. Arguably, no waiver could have been found in Francis under the standard definition
of waiver as established by Johnson and Fay. See notes 24 & 25 supra.
49. 425 U.S. at 543 (Brennan, J., dissenting), citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963).
50. In Francis, which was limited to only grand jury claims, the Court distinguished and
reaffirmed Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975), a habeas corpus case involving an
unconstitutional search and seizure claim. Lefkowitz had held that a plea of guilty in the state
court, which extinguished the possibility of appeal, did not bar habeas corpus relief where
evidence against the defendant had been unlawfully obtained. Id. at 293. Less than three
months after it decided Francis and expressly upheld Lefkowitz, the Court overruled
Lefkowitz in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (exclusionary rule held not an individual
right preservable on appellate or collateral review). After Stone, it appears that state courts
will have an increasingly important role as arbiters of fourth amendment claims under the
exclusionary rule. See also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (failure to object to being
tried in prison clothing held a waiver of such objection when defendant not compelled to do
so).
51. Chief Justice Burger has spoken out against the increase of habeas applications in the
federal courts resulting from the Fay decision, terming it a "tidal wave." Burger, The State
of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929 (1970).
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gories of constitutional claims on a decision by decision basis. How-
ever, under the codified habeas statutes and a long line of interpre-
tive cases," the issue on habeas had come to be solely whether the
detention was in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States. Contrary to this tradition, that question of federal law may
now be answered largely within the state courts. How, and how
consistently, substantive constitutional rights will be interpreted
there is the important question which remains.
Lynette Norton
52. See, e.g., Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941) (habeas petitions could not be
disposed of by ex parte affidavits; sufficient allegations by prisoner mandated taking of
testimony); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (detention unlawful despite fair trial and
conviction where indictment under which conviction obtained was unconstitutional). See also
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-415 (1963) (Brennan, J.) (summarizing some of the Supreme
Court's major habeas corpus decisions).

